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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
Tyson Michael Pieper appeals from the judgment entered upon his guilty plea to 
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine.  On appeal, Pieper argues that 
the district court erred when it denied his motion to suppress.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 
At around 10:30 p.m., Officer Weidebush and Officer Johns drove through the 
Cherry Hill Park parking lot to do a patrol check.  (11/2/16 Tr., p. 25, L. 23 – p.  28, L. 
18, p. 41, L. 15 – p. 42, L. 7.)  They saw two vehicles parked in the parking lot.  (11/2/16 
Tr., p. 25, L. 23 – p.  28, L. 18.)  It was not normal for cars to be at the park at that time.  
(11/2/16 Tr., p. 43, Ls. 9-14.)  One of the cars had a blue light coming from inside.  
(11/2/16 Tr., p. 41, L. 24 – p. 43, L. 14.)  The officers parked their car and went to check 
on the vehicle, which turned out to be the vehicle in which Pieper was sitting.  (11/2/16 
Tr., p. 25, L. 23 – p. 28, L. 18.)   
The police car did not block Pieper’s car.  (11/2/16 Tr., p. 28, Ls. 9-21, p. 50, Ls. 
8-22.)  The officers did not turn on their car’s overhead lights.  (11/2/16 Tr., p. 28, L. 22 – 
p. 29, L. 22.)  Nor did the officers use their car’s spotlight.  (11/2/16 Tr., p. 51, Ls. 9-13.)  
Officer Johns approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and Officer Weidebush 




A.1)  Both officers used flashlights to look into the interior of the car.  (Id.)   
Officer Johns asked Pieper, who was sitting in the driver’s seat, “Can I talk to you 
guys?”  (11/2/16 Tr., p. 37, L. 19 – p. 39, L. 10.)  Pieper answered in the affirmative.  
(Id.)  Within seconds of making contact, Officer Weideman saw a “big ol’ jar of weed” 
sitting in plain view in the back seat of the car.  (11/2/16 Tr., p. 39, L. 19 – p. 40, L. 7, p. 
31, L. 5 – p. 32, L. 4.)  The following is transcribed from the officers’ body cameras 
starting when Officer Johns made initial contact with Pieper:   
Officer Johns: Can I talk to you guys?   
 
Pieper:  Yup. 
 
Officer Johns:  You got any I.D. on ya?  Both of ya? 
 
Pieper:  Yeah, I got some in my bag here.  
 
Officer Johns:  We just hanging out in the park today?   
 
Pieper:  We’re just texting.  I’m from Montana.  We’re just … 
 
Officer Weidebush:  Holy Cow.  Big ol’ jar of weed back here.   
 
                                                 
1 Defendant’s Exhibit A consists of recordings from Officer Johns’ and Officer 
Weidebush’s body cameras.  (See 11/2/16 Tr., p. 70, L. 24 – p. 72, L. 8.)  The exhibit is 
divided up into several files.  The two most pertinent files are “1117441.avi” which is a 
recording of the initial encounter from Officer Johns’ body camera, and “1117437.avi” 
which is a recording of the same initial encounter but from Officer Weidebush’s body 




(Defendant’s Exhibit A, 1117441.avi at 0:00 to 0:15; 1117437.avi a 0:09 to 0:24.2)  
Officer Weidebush observed the marijuana in plain view approximately 15 seconds after 
Officer Johns made the initial contact.  (See id.)   
 After being informed about the marijuana in the car, Officer Johns instructed 
Pieper to step out of the vehicle and detained him in handcuffs.  (11/2/16 Tr., p. 53, L. 13 
– p. 54, L. 2.)  Pursuant to the subsequent search, the officers found a gun, paraphernalia, 
methamphetamine, morphine, oxycodone, hydrocodone, scales and baggies.  (R., pp. 14-
22.)   
The state charged Pieper with four counts of possession of a controlled substance.  
(R., pp. 67-69.)  Pieper filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the initial encounter was 
not consensual and constituted a warrantless seizure.  (R., pp. 51-53, 90-107.)  The state 
responded and argued that the initial encounter was consensual and no seizure occurred 
until after Officer Weidebush observed marijuana in plain view in the backseat of the car.  
(R., pp. 108-114.)  The district court held a hearing on the motion to suppress.  (R., pp. 
115-118.)  Officer Johns and Officer Weidebush testified.  (See id.)   
Officer Weidebush testified he saw the marijuana sitting in plain view in the 
backseat of the car.  (11/2/16 Tr., p. 32, L. 20 – p. 33, L. 10.)  The officers also testified 
                                                 
2 Both of the officers’ body camera recordings were utilized in the above transcription, 
which was transcribed by counsel for the respondent.  The court also admitted a transcript 
of various video clips as Defendant’s Exhibit B.  (See 11/2/16 Tr., p. 70, L. 24 – p. 72, L. 
8.)  For reasons that are not clear in the record, these transcriptions separate out the 
interaction between Officer Johns and Pieper and the interaction between Officer 
Weidebush and the car passenger.  (See Defendant’s Ex. B.)  However, for purposes of 
determining when the encounter changed from a consensual encounter to a detention, it is 
important to note when Officer Weidebush informed Officer Johns there is a “big ol’ jar 





that when they approached the car, they did not have their guns drawn, nor did they issue 
any commands, orders or threats.  (11/2/16 Tr., p. 33, L. 11 – p. 34, L. 22, p. 51, L. 18 – 
p. 53, L. 12.) 
The district court denied Pieper’s motion to suppress.  (R., pp. 119-120.)  The 
district court found that the encounter was consensual up until Officer Weidebush 
observed the marijuana and Officer Johns ordered Pieper out of the car.  (11/2/16 Tr., p. 
67, L. 17 – p. 70, L. 16.)  Pieper pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, 
methamphetamine, and reserved his right to challenge the denial of his motion to 
suppress on appeal.  (R., pp. 122-130.)  The state dismissed the remaining charges.  (Id.)  
The district court entered judgment and sentenced Pieper to five years with one year 







Pieper states the issue on appeal as: 
 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Pieper’s motion to suppress?   
 
(Appellant’s brief, p. 6.) 
 
 The state rephrases the issue as: 
 
 Has Pieper failed to show the district court erred when it denied his motion to 






The District Court Did Not Err When It Determined That The Initial Encounter Between 




 Officer Johns and Officer Weidebush approached Pieper’s parked car and asked to 
speak with him and the other occupant of the vehicle.  (11/2/16 Tr., p. 37, L. 19 – p. 39, 
L. 10.)  Pieper agreed.  (Id.)  Officer Johns asked if Pieper had any identification and, 
while Pieper was looking for his identification, Officer Weidebush saw a “big ol’ jar of 
weed” in the back seat.  (11/2/16 Tr., p. 39, L. 19 – p. 40, L. 7, p. 31, L. 5 – p. 32, L. 4.)  
Officer Johns then ordered the occupants out of the car.  (11/2/16 Tr., p. 53, L. 13 – p. 54, 
L. 2.)  The district court ruled that no seizure occurred until Officer Johns gave the order 
to exit the car.  (11/2/16 Tr., p. 67, L. 17 – p. 70, L. 16.)  The district court did not err.   
 
B. Standard Of Review 
 
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated.  When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the trial court’s findings 
of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of 
constitutional principles to those facts.”  State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 302, 160 P.3d 739, 
741 (2007). The power to assess the credibility of witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, 
weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is vested in the trial court.  State v. Valdez-
Molina, 127 Idaho 102, 106, 897 P.2d 993, 997 (1995); State v. Fleenor, 133 Idaho 552, 
555, 989 P.2d 784, 787 (Ct. App. 1999).  The appellate court also gives deference to any 
implicit findings of the trial court supported by substantial evidence.  State v. Brauch, 133 




C. Pieper Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Determined That 
The Initial Approach And Question About Identification Did Not Constitute A 
Seizure 
 
“An encounter between a law enforcement officer and a citizen does not trigger 
Fourth Amendment scrutiny unless it is nonconsensual.”  State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 
482, 486, 211 P.3d 91, 95 (2009) (citations omitted).  To constitute a seizure, the officer 
must, “by means of physical force or show of authority,” in some way restrain an 
individual’s liberty.  Id.  This “requires words or actions, or both, by a law enforcement 
officer that would convey to a reasonable person that the officer was ordering him or her 
to restrict his or her movement.”  Id. (citations omitted).  “[A] request for identification or 
mere questioning is not enough, by itself[,] to constitute a seizure.”  State v. Landreth, 
139 Idaho 986, 990, 88 P.3d 1226, 1230 (2004) (citations omitted).  “This is so because 
the person approached need not answer any question put to him and may decline to listen 
to the questions at all and go about his business.”  State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 523-
524, 826 P.2d 481, 484-485 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497-
498 (1983)).  “Thus, where an officer merely approaches a person who is standing on the 
street, or seated in a non-moving vehicle located in a public place, and poses a few 
questions, no seizure has occurred.”  Id. (citation omitted).  The relevant inquiry is 
whether, under the totality of the circumstances, “a reasonable person would feel free to 
disregard the law enforcement officer”; if so, “then the encounter is consensual.”  
Willoughby, 147 Idaho at 486, 211 P.3d at 95. 
Here, the district court found that the initial encounter between Pieper and Officer 
Johns was consensual.  (11/2/16 Tr., p. 67, L. 17 – p. 70, L. 16.)  The district court 




to examine identification.”  (Id.)  The district court found that the officers gave no 
commands until Officer Weidebush saw the marijuana in plain view and Officer Johns 
ordered Pieper out of the car.  (Id. (“There’s no command until: ‘Get out of the car.  Put 
your hands behind you back,’ after the statement being made by Weidebush that he saw a 
big old jar of weed.”).)  The Court reasoned:   
So, what did the police do here or not do to convey a message that 
compliance with their requests is required? 
 This by all appearances happened very rapidly.  And I’m finding 
that there is no – well, regardless of where you put the burden of proof, 
whether the defendant has the burden of proving seizure, or the plaintiff 
has the burden of proving consensual encounter.  The plaintiffs met that 
burden.  The defendant has failed to meet its burden.   
 At all times up to when Officer Johns told the defendant to get out 
of the car, put his hands behind their back, this is at all times a consensual 
encounter.  
 The fact there’s two officers; that fact that it’s at night, everything 
is – that doesn’t change my analysis.  It’s consensual.  It’s asking 
questions.  There’s no command until: “Get out of the car.  Put your hands 
behind you back,” after the statement being made by Weidebush that he 
saw a big old jar of weed.   
 And from that point and – and the “big old jar of weed” isn’t going 
to be suppressed.  It’s only statements that were made from that point in 
time on, from the time that Johns said based on Weidebush’s response, 
“There’s a big old jar of weed; put your hands behind your back,” and 
cuffs him, until Miranda is read, if it’s ever read, I don’t know if it is, then 
any statements are suppressed, any statements by the defendant are 
suppressed, but not the evidence, not the – not the weed.   
 So, I mean, up until that point in time, there’s no suppression of 
any statements.  And there’s – there’s no suppression of the – of the – if 
it’s weed that was found.   
 And I don’t know of any – I haven’t been cited any case law that 
would say that you can’t use a flashlight to find out what’s and who’s 
inside a car.  And that’s plain view with the assistance of a flashlight at 
night.  I don’t know.  I have not been cited to anything that tells me that 
that’s improper.   
 Certainly, the location of the officers’ car is not something that 
would make a reasonable citizen feel that he was being restrained, didn’t 
have the ability to leave.  And that’s the standard.  It’s not what happens at 
Wendy’s.  It’s whether a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the 




case; that hasn’t been proven up until the time that John – or that – yeah – 
that Johns says based on Weidebush’s claim that there’s a big old pot of 
weed in the back, jar of weed in the back, “Get out of the car,” Johns says, 
and, “Put your hands behind your back.”  That’s when there’s a seizure.  
That’s when it’s no longer consensual.  That’s when Miranda was needed 
for anything not to be suppressed.  
 So that’s my ruling.   
 
(11/2/16 Tr., p. 68, L. 16 – p. 70, L. 16.)  
The district court did not err.  Up and until Officer Weidebush saw the marijuana 
and Johns ordered Pieper out of the car, the encounter was consensual.  On appeal, Pieper 
first argues that the encounter was not consensual because Pieper was seized when 
Officer Johns and Officer Weidebush approached his car with flashlights.  (See 
Appellant’s brief, pp. 12-13.)  Second, Pieper argues he was seized when Officer Johns 
asked for identification because, if he ignored the request for identification, he would 
have violated Idaho Code §§ 18-705 (resisting and obstructing officers) and 49-316 
(driver’s license to be carried and exhibited on demand).  (See id.)  Both of Pieper’s 
arguments fail.   
First, the fact that the officers approached the car with flashlights did not 
transform an otherwise consensual encounter into a seizure.  Simply approaching a car 
with flashlights is not physical force or a show of authority that would restrain Pieper’s 
individual liberty.  “A majority of jurisdictions have held that ‘the mere approach and 
questioning of [persons in parked vehicles] does not constitute a seizure.’”  State v. 
Zubizareta, 122 Idaho 823, 839 P.2d 1237 (Ct. App. 1992) (quoting W. LaFave, Search 
and Seizure § 9.2(h), at 415–16 and 408–409 n. 230 (2nd ed. 1987)); cf. State v. Ramirez, 
121 Idaho 319, 322, 824 P.2d 894, 897 (Ct. App. 1991) (“An officer’s use of a flashlight 




Examples of circumstances that might indicate seizure, even where the 
person did not attempt to leave, would be the threatening presence of 
several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical 
touching of the person of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of 
voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might be 
compelled. 
 
State v. Liechty, 152 Idaho 163, 168, 267 P.3d 1278, 1283 (Ct. App. 2011) (quoting 
United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)).  “Other circumstances that may 
indicate seizure include whether the officer used overhead emergency lights and whether 
the officer took action to block a vehicle’s exit route.”  Id. (citing Willoughby, 147 Idaho 
at 487–88, 211 P.3d at 96–97; State v. Schmidt, 137 Idaho 301, 302–03, 47 P.3d 1271, 
1272–73 (Ct. App. 2002); State v. Fry, 122 Idaho 100, 103, 831 P.2d 942, 945 (Ct. App. 
1991)).  The Court of Appeals in Liechty explained that “no seizure occurred when the 
officer approached Liechty’s parked vehicle and tapped on his window.”  Id.  “Further, 
the officer, without activating his overhead lights, approached Liechty’s vehicle alone, 
without a weapon drawn, and did not physically touch Liechty or use threatening 
language upon opening the passenger door.”  Id.  The seizure in Liechty only occurred 
because the officer opened the passenger door without Liechty’s consent, stood in the 
open passenger doorway, blocked Liechty’s exit, and questioned him.  Id. at 169, 267 
P.3d at 1284; compare State v. Osborne, 121 Idaho 520, 523, 826 P.2d 481, 484 (Ct. App. 
1991) (no seizure initially occurred when the police first approached Osborne’s vehicle, 
which was parked on a public street).   
In Fry, the Idaho Court of Appeals determined that the police encounter was not 
consensual and that Fry was “seized.”  See Fry, 122 Idaho at 103, 831 P.2d at 945.  In 




Appeals found it significant that one of the officers, Officer Dunbar, “placed himself 
directly behind Fry’s vehicle, the front end of which was nearly against the wall of a 
building, making it impossible for Fry to drive away without running over Officer 
Dunbar.”  Id. (citation omitted).   
Here, Officer Johns and Officer Weidebush approached Pieper’s car, which was 
parked in a public parking lot, did not block Pieper’s exit, did not activate overhead 
lights, did not physically touch Pieper, and did not use threatening language.  Because the 
officers simply approached Pieper’s car with flashlights and did not utilize physical force 
or a show of authority to restrain Pieper’s individual liberty, the encounter was 
consensual and no seizure occurred.   
Second, Officer Johns’ inquiry about identification did not turn the consensual 
encounter into a seizure.  “Even when officers have no basis for suspecting a particular 
individual, they may generally ask the individual questions and ask to examine 
identification.”  Fry, 122 Idaho at 102, 831 P.2d at 944 (citing Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 
U.S. 1 (1984); INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984); State v. Zapp, 108 Idaho 723, 701 
P.2d 671 (Ct. App. 1985)).  Here, Officer Johns asked for permission to speak to Pieper, 
which was granted, and then asked if Pieper had any identification. 
Pieper’s arguments regarding Idaho Code §§ 18-705 (resisting and obstructing 
officers) and 49-316 (driver’s license to be carried and exhibited on demand) are similarly 
unavailing.  Idaho Code § 18-705 states that anyone who “willfully resists, delays or 
obstructs any public officer, in the discharge, or attempt to discharge, of any duty of his 
office or who knowingly gives a false report to any peace officer” is guilty of a 




to give identification to an officer.  Further, contrary to Pieper’s assertions, Officer Johns 
never “demanded” to see his identification.  Rather, after Pieper agreed to talk with him, 
Officer Johns simply asked whether Pieper and the passenger had “got any I.D.” on them.  
Because Officer Johns never ordered Pieper to produce identification, Pieper would not 
have been subject to criminal liability by not giving it to him.   
For similar reasons, Pieper also would not have been subject to liability under 
Idaho Code § 49-316.  That statute states: “Every licensee shall have his driver’s license 
in his immediate possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle and shall, upon 
demand, surrender the driver’s license into the hands of a peace officer for his 
inspection.”  I.C. § 49-316.  Again, asking if Pieper had any I.D. was not a demand to 
produce a license.  Even if it was, Pieper was not required by Idaho Code § 49-316 to 
produce a license because he was not “operating” a motor vehicle at the time.  The 
vehicle was parked, and at no time during the interaction was the vehicle in operation.  
Additionally, Officer Johns never actually took possession of Pieper’s driver’s license.  
According to the video recording, Pieper was still looking for the license when Officer 
Weidebush saw the marijuana in plain view.   
In Osborne, supra the Court noted that a seizure does not occur when “an officer 
merely approaches a person who is ... seated in a non-moving vehicle located in a public 
place, and poses a few questions[.]”  Osborne, 121 Idaho at 523, 826 P.2d at 484 
(citations omitted).  In Osborne, the Court of Appeals concluded that no seizure occurred 
when the police approached Osborne’s vehicle, which was parked on a public street.  Id.  
However, because Osborne was sitting in the driver’s seat with the engine running, a 




reasoned that because Idaho Code § 49-316 required Osborne to have a license when 
operating a motor vehicle, Osborne was legally required to comply with the officer’s 
request and could not drive away without violating the law.  Id.  Thus, under those 
circumstances, Osborne could not have reasonably believed he was at liberty to ignore the 
officers and go about his business.  Id.   
In contrast, Pieper was not operating his motor vehicle.  He was sitting in a fully 
stopped and parked car in a parking lot.  Further, there was no evidence in Osborne that 
the officers first asked permission to speak with Osborne.  See id.  Here, before asking 
whether Pieper had any I.D., Officer Johns asked “Can I talk to you guys?”  Based upon 
the totality of the circumstances, the question regarding whether Pieper possessed any 
identification did not constitute a seizure. 
In addition, the Osborne Court concluded, “Accordingly, we conclude that 
Osborne was ‘seized’ within the meaning of the fourth amendment when Deputy Costello 
took his license.”  Id.  In the present case, Deputy Johns never actually took, much less 
retained, Pieper’s license prior to the discovery of the marijuana.  “This Court has 
previously held that a limited detention does occur when an officer retains a driver’s 
license or other paperwork of value.”  State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 844,103 P.3d 454, 
457 (2004) (citing State v. Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 493, 826 P.2d 452, 454 (1992); State 
v. Martinez, 136 Idaho 436, 439, 34 P.3d 1119, 1122 (Ct. App. 2001)).  As the video 
evidence establishes, Officer Johns asked if Pieper had any identification, and while 
Pieper was looking for it, Officer Weidebush observed the marijuana in plain view.  (See 




Further, even if the inquiry about identification constituted a “seizure,” it was 
reasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.  The Idaho Supreme Court has held that 
if the initial contact is valid and lawful, a brief detention of a driver to do a status check 
on the driver’s license is reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.  State v. 
Godwin, 121 Idaho 491, 495, 826 P.2d 452, 456 (1992) (“[W]e conclude … that a police 
officer’s brief detention of a driver to run a status check on the driver’s license, after 
making a valid, lawful contact with the driver, is reasonable for purposes of the fourth 
amendment.”).  Here, Officer Johns’ initial contact with Pieper (“Can I talk to you 
guys?”) followed by Pieper’s consent was a valid, lawful contact.  Thus even if Officer 
Johns had actually taken Pieper’s driver’s license and run a status check on that license, 
that would have been reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.   
Pieper was not detained until after Officer Weidebush observed the marijuana in 
plain view.  An officer may seize an individual if the officer has reasonable, articulable 
suspicions that the individual has committed or is about to commit a crime.  See Florida 
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498 (1983); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968); Fry, 122 Idaho 
at 103, 831 P.2d at 945.  Officer Weidebush’s observation of the marijuana was not a 
“search” within the meaning of the Constitution.  Ramirez, 121 Idaho at 322, 824 P.2d at 
897 (“An officer’s use of a flashlight to illuminate the darkened interior of a vehicle does 
not raise the officer’s observation to the level of a search.”) (citation omitted).  “It is well-
established that the observation of items in public view is not a ‘search’ within the 
meaning of the Constitution and therefore is not subject to fourth amendment scrutiny.”  
Id. (citations omitted).  Once Officer Weidebush observed the marijuana in plain view, he 




The district court did not err by finding that the initial 15-second encounter was 
consensual.   
CONCLUSION 
  
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.   
 
 DATED this 7th day of December, 2017. 
 
 
             
       /s/ Ted S. Tollefson______________ 
       TED S. TOLLEFSON 
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